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ABSTRACT
We examine the physical layer security for machine type communication net-
works and highlight a secure communication scenario that consists of a transmit-
ter Alice, which employs Transmit Antenna Selection, while a legitimate receiver
Bob that uses Maximum Ratio Combining, as well as an eavesdropper Eve. We
provide a solution to avoid eavesdropping and provide ways to quantify security
and reliability. We obtain closed-form expressions for Multiple-Input Multiple-
Output and Multi-antenna Eavesdropper (MIMOME) scenario. The closed-form
expressions for three useful variations of MIMOME scenario, i.e., MISOME, MI-
MOSE, and MISOSE are also provided. A low cost and less complex system
for utilizing the spatial diversity in multiple antennas system, while guarantee-
ing secrecy and reliability. In our model, we assume that Bob, Alice and Eve can
estimate their channel state information. We evaluate the performance of closed-
form expressions in terms of secrecy outage probability and provide Monte Carlo
simulations to corroborate the proposed analytical framework.
Keywords: Physical layer security, Outage probability, Reliability, Transmission
rate, MIMOME, Machine type communication, TAS, MRC, Eavesdropper.
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CSI Channel State Information
MIMOME Multiple Input Multiple Output Multiple Antenna Eavesdropper
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LTE Long Term Evolution
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5G Fifth mobile generation
4G Fourth mobile generation
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MTD Machine Type Devices
HTC Human Type Communication
eMMB Enhanced Mobile Broadband
TAS Transmit Antenna Selection
MRC Maximal Ratio Combining
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AWGN Additive White Gaussian Noise
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γB Instantaneous Signal to Noise Ratio at Bob
γE Instantaneous Signal to Noise Ratio at Eve
γB Average Signal to Noise Ratio at Bob
γE Average Signal to Noise Ratio at Eve
Γ(s) Gamma function
Q (s, z) Regularized upper incomplete gamma function
P (s, z) Regularized lower incomplete gamma function
RS Transmission Rate
Cb Capacity of legitimate (Bob) link
Ce Capacity of Eavesdropper link
Pr Probability
E[.] Expectation of
xi transmitted signal vector of node
yi received signal vector of node
ni signal noise
hi channel fading coefficient
loge Natural logarithm to the base e
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1. INTRODUCTION
The advancement in the field of wireless technologies has revolutionized the world.
Nowadays, wireless networks are a vital part of our lives due to such wide-scale pro-
liferation of wirelessly communicating devices. Both the number of devices as well
as the data produced by these devices, has increased. The increase in data traffic re-
quires enhanced capacity and bandwidth utilization, which cannot be satisfied by the
existing deployed wireless technologies [1]. To fulfill these requirements, intensive re-
search has been carried out towards the 5G of wireless communication. The technical
requirements of 5G over existing deployed technologies are listed below [2];
• Thousand times higher mobile data volume per area;
• The user data rate will be ten to a hundred times higher;
• Connected number of devices will be ten to a hundred times higher than currently
connected devices;
• Ten times longer battery life for low power devices;
• Low latency.
The new research led to architectural and component innovative changes in the design
of 5G [3]. These changes are explained by following five technologies:
1. Device Centric Architectures: Cellular design depended on the self-evident
role of the cell as it is the basic unit within the radio access network. Under such
consideration, a device can establish downlink and uplink connection to achieve
service, to carry both control and data traffic, and device location [3]. The cur-
rent cell-centric architecture needs to evolve into device-centric one, where hu-
man or machine could communicate by exchanging information through various
heterogeneous nodes, due to the following trends.
• Increased data traffic caused an increase in number of users per base station
(base station density) with the rise of heterogeneous networks. Some major
changes in network densification are required in 5G.
• The emerging concept of the centralized baseband is associated with cloud
radio access networks [4] where virtualization is responsible for decoupling
a node and hardware assigned to manage to process linked with the same
node. The network operator can allocate hardware recourses to the different
set of nodes dynamically.
• Radio access network could be affected by the use of smarter devices. The
architecture of both device-to-device and smart caching needs to be re-
defined where the center of gravity is transferred to devices, relays and
wireless proxies [3]
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2. Millimeter Wave (mmWave): The range of millimeter wave is from 30GHz to
300GHz is high electromagnetic radiation radio frequency band known as Ex-
tremely High Frequency (EHF), while the spectrum from 3GHz to 30GHz is
Super High Frequency (SHF) band. In both, SHF and EHF, the radio waves
share similar propagation characteristics so the spectrum 3GHz to 300GHz with
a wavelength of 1 to 100mm is referred to as millimeter Wave (mmWave) [5].
The spectrum scarcity at microwave frequencies encouraged researchers towards
mmWaves and to look at various features of mmWaves transmission [3]. The
mmWave frequencies have a massive amount of spectrum, i.e., local point distri-
bution spectrum at 28-30GHz, 60GHz license-free band, E-band at 71-76 GHz,
81-86GHz and 92-95GHz [3]. The same frequency is used for mmWaves com-
munication because of high attenuation in free space penetration, for short dis-
tances. The high frequencies of mmWave reduce antenna’s physical size and en-
able building complex antenna arrays, which are the prominent part of mmWave.
These arrays are envisioned to eradicate frequency dependence and provide max-
imum gain to minimize thermal noise bandwidth. Interference is brought down
by narrow beam adaptive arrays, which shows the noise-limited conditions suit
the mmWave system better than interference-limited conditions.
3. Massive MIMO: The large-scale antenna system also referred to as Massive
multiple input multiple output (Massive MIMO) is the primary attribute of ad-
vanced cellular wireless systems, Massive MIMO is a multiuser MIMO, where
the base station has many more antennas than devices per signaling resources
[6]. The use of the law of large number averages out the frequency dependen-
cies in the channels and hence substantial gain can be achieved. Massive MIMO
provides two advantages.
As some features are listed below [7]:
• Spectral efficiency: The terminals’ spatial multiplexing in the same time-
frequency resources provides spectral efficiency. To gain efficient multi-
plexing, channels need to be different for different terminals sufficiently
[7].
• Energy Efficiency: The maximum array allows a reduction in radiated
power and use of low-accuracy signals and linear processing save more
power. [7].
• Digital processing: Every antenna in the MIMO system has an RF and a
digital baseband chain. Base station operates signals from each antenna si-
multaneously. The main benefit of digital processing is the uplink’s chan-
nel response measurement, to nullify any assumption on the propagation
channel.
• Array gain: MIMO systems have multiple antennas, which may work in the
form of an array to provide maximum gain. Gain is directly proportional
to the number of the antenna in the base stations.
• Channel hardening (a fading channel behaves as if it was a non-fading
channel) eliminates the effects of fast fading. It also helps in solving re-
source allocation problems.
8
However, there is still a need to tackle research challenges in MIMO systems
like channel estimation, and user mobility.
4. Smart devices: The previous cellular generations were designed in a way where
the complete control was on the infrastructure side. This idea to be dropped in
future systems. Protocol stack layers should utilize intelligence at device side,
e.g., by permitting device-to-device connectivity [3].
5. Native support for machine-to-machine communication: Machine to ma-
chine (M2M) communication also known as Machine type communication
(MTC) is an emerging technology. In M2M, a massive number of devices can be
connected to a base station, unlike current systems which generally operate few
hundreds of devices on a single base station. MTC communication has strong
link reliability. This technology will be explained in details later.
The aforementioned five innovative technologies could lead to both design and
architectural changes in the future wireless generation. Regarding requirement
and objectives, 5G has been classified into three types of communications [8],
which are explained below.
1.1. Ultra-Reliable Low Latency Communication (URLLC):
Despite the enormous growth in the number of users, the commercial wireless tech-
nologies from 2G to 4G were not able to achieve 99.999% reliability. This is because
the design of wireless communication technologies most of the time offer relatively
good connectivity with zero data rate in those areas where coverage is quite poor with
immoderate interference [8]. The communication stage where reliability is 99.999%
guaranteed among devices and latency required is extremely low is known as Ultra-
reliable low latency communication. URLLC is one of new operating modes in 5G
and is making wireless a reliable commodity. URLLC from the perspective of sup-
porting real-time applications with extremely low latency requirement will be used in
mission-critical communication (for instance drones, virtual reality, autonomous driv-
ing, remote surgeries) [9]. URLLC has mainly two functions, latency and reliability.
Latency is the time a packet takes to arrive at the receiver’s physical layer from trans-
mitter’s physical layer. [10]. There are three types of latency; first, an end-to-end (E2E)
latency includes queuing delay, transmission delay and computing or processing delay.
Assuming latency of 1ms and considering the speed of light constraint (299,792km/s),
the receiver can be located at a distance of approximately 150 km [11]. Second, a user
plane latency, assuming single user, the minimum requirement is 1ms for URLLC, and
the third one is control plane latency that is the time required to start a continuous
data transfer from idle mode and it’s minimum requirement is 20ms [11]. Reliability
is the probability of successful data transmission within time period T. Reliability de-
mands the successful data transmission under stringent latency requirements. Next, we
examine the critical enablers for high reliability and low-latency communication.
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1.1.1. Low-Latency
Deterministic, arbitrary or random components affect latency. The minimum latency is
defined by deterministic components, with the latency’s spread, mainly its tails, being
affected by the arbitrary or random components. The components of deterministic la-
tency include the time-to-transmit information, the wait-time-between-transmissions
information, and the overhead (reference signals, parity bits). While on the other
hand, time-to-retransmit information, overhead (when required), queuing delay, ran-
dom back-off times and other computing or processing delays, comprise the random
components [11]. In the following, we will discuss the different types of enablers used
for low latency communication:
• Short Transmission Time Interval (TTI), short frame structure and HARQ:
Its primary function is the reduction of TTI duration, which is achieved by utiliz-
ing fewer OFDM symbols for each TTI and by limiting OFDM symbols through
broader sub-carrier spacing and by decreasing the HARQ roundtrip-time. Like-
wise, when the OFDM symbol duration is decreased, the sub-carrier spacing
increases. Consequently, the queuing effect is accentuated due to the availabil-
ity of a fewer number of resource blocks in the frequency domain. Contrary to
this, control-overhead is increased, resulting in reduced capacity due to lack of
resources for other URLLC data transmissions, when TTI duration is clipped.
This fault is easily remedied by the use of grant-free transmission during the
uplink. The downlink provides the capacity to deal with non-negligible queuing
delays by using lengthier TTIs at higher loads [12].
• eMBB/URLLC multiplexing: Because of its latency or reliability, a static or
semi-static resource between eMBB and URLLC transmissions might be pre-
ferred, but it is very inefficient when it comes to utilization of resources, and thus
requires dynamic multiplexing for proper operation [12]. Instead of enhancing
power of resources that are narrow-band in nature, more frequency-domain re-
sources can be assigned to a UL (uplink) Transmission to achieve high system
reliability for URLLC. It follows that wide-ranging band resources will be re-
quired for URLLC uplink transmission, if increased reliability is to be achieved
while keeping latency relatively low. Likewise, whenever any new low-latency
packet arrives in the middle of a frame, the routinely scheduled traffic will need
to be forestalled, which can be achieved by using creative scheduling techniques.
Concurrently, for maximum efficiency, the eMBB traffic should not be substan-
tially affected if URLLC outage capacity is increased [11].
• Edge Caching, Computing and Slicing: Studies have shown that latency has
been substantially reduced by edge computing resources and caching [13], [14].
With new technology of resource-intensive-applications (e.g., AR/VR), these
trends will continue in future. Network slicing is another technology that is
destined to remain in service for allocating committed resources (e.g., caching,
bandwidth, computing) for services that are mission-critical.
• On-device machine learning / Artificial intelligence (AI) on edge: Machine
Learning forms the basis for active and low-latency network systems. Conven-
tionally the concept of ML is contingent upon only a single node (centralized).
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This single node has full access to a global dataset and uses significant storage
and computing capacity. Still, the inadequacies of this system for applications,
which are delay sensitive and require high reliability, have warranted renewed
interest in Distributed Machine Learning (e.g., Deep Learning and federated
learning) which is considered the new avenue in the ubiquitous field of Artificial
Intelligence, also called ML [15].
• Grant-Free vs. Grant-Based Access: It is either related to the dynamic
scheduling of UL, or it may relate to intermittent traffic against periodic traffic
with persistent scheduling. Devices operate on an optimum level when they are
provided fast access to uplink on a priority basis, but this approach decreases ca-
pacity because resources are already allocated. In the same way, semi-persistent,
unutilized resources can be reallocated to eMBB traffic. For collective semi-
persistent scheduling, to reduce collisions, contention-based access is carried
out, with the same characteristics and in the same group. Here, a base station
plays a pivotal role in controlling the load and dynamically adjusting the resource
pool. For optimum resource utilization, the base set makes proactive scheduling
of retransmission. It does this within the same group of UE having the same
traffic [16].
• Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access (NOMA): NOMA reduces latency, because
it supports more users that are sustained by Orthogonal Multiple Access. It does
so by multiplexing the domain in the uplink and then either using Successive
interference cancellation (SIC) or other receivers which are more advanced such
as Massage Passing, Turbo Reception. Nonetheless, issues such as user ordering,
processing delay, imperfect channel state information, are not fully understood
[17].
• Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles/systems:
Backhaul latency has been a big problem for long-range applications in rural
areas. The use of Low-Earth Orbiting Satellites can satisfactorily resolve this
problem. Moreover, the rising use of Unmanned Ariel Systems can be of great
help in reducing such latencies [11].
• Joint Flexible Resource Allocation for UL/DL: UL/DL operating concurrently
with Time Slot Length versus Switching Cost is required for TDD systems (study
conducted in a context of LTE-A). LTE TDD and NR have been investigated for
FDD. While only NR have been investigated for TDD because LTE TDD is not
required for URLLC improvements [11].
1.1.2. Reliability
Factors affect reliability: i) channel access which is uncoordinated, that results in colli-
sion with other users; ii) the sharing of frequency by different systems; iii) interference
from adjoining access channels; iv) moving devices causing Doppler shift; v) synchro-
nization difficulty; vi) outdated CSI; vii) delayed packet reception; and viii) effects of
time-varying channels. At the physical layer level, the reliability is affected by chan-
nel, constellation, error detection codes, modulation techniques, diversity, mechanisms
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of retransmission. Low rate codes to induce redundancy in poor channel conditions,
retransmission to correct errors and Automatic Repeat-reQuest (ARQ) in transport lay-
ers, are some methods used to increase reliability. Beamforming and diversity produce
numerous independent paths, which can be used from the transmitter to receiver and
can also boost the signal-to-noise ratio. The fundamental difference between frequency
diversity and time diversity is that the former happens if the information is transmit-
ted over a frequency-selective channel while the latter happens when a forward error
correction codeword is distributed on various channels. Multi-user diversity, happens
when transmission relaying is done by using different users right from the source to the
sink [11]. In the following lines, we shall discuss various tools that facilitate reliability
[11].
• Multi-Connectivity and Harnessing Time/Frequency/RATs Diversity: Time
diversity is not always a feasible solution, especially in cases when the toler-
able latency is smaller than channel coherence or in cases of stringent relia-
bility requirements. More often than not, three-dimensional diversity is used
because frequency diversity is not always on par with the number of users or
devices. Therefore, high-reliable communication is most effective in enabling
multi-connectivity.
• Multicast: Multicast is much more reliable as compared to unicast when it
comes to receiving the same information. Reliability is contingent upon, the
range of coverage and type of MCS used in the multicast group. The practicality
of multicast is also dependent on factors such as the range of transmission (short
or long) because cell edge users restrict the performance.
• Data Replication (Contents and Computations): Data replication is required
whenever synchronization is not possible among nodes or whenever a backhaul
with low-rate is needed for synchronization, or whenever there is a lack of CSI.
Nevertheless, this often reduces capacity. This failure can be avoided to keep
replicating the same data over and over again unless an ACK is received in case
of HARQ.
• HARQ + Short Frame Structure, Short TTI: This is used to achieve high
reliability. It does so by utilizing retransmissions to improve outage capacity.
Reaching the optimum level of MCS all the while staying within the limits of
reliability and latency constraints is a problem still open to research.
• Diversity via Network Coding and Relaying: In situations where the phe-
nomena such as diversity of time are unreliable and extreme fading of events
occurs, URLLC can only be ensured by taking care of factors such as diversity
and sturdiness during the manufacturing stage. Therefore, to guarantee reliable,
reciprocal communication without depending on frequency and time diversity,
it is pertinent to take full advantage of network coding (using concurrent relay-
ing) and multi-user diversity. In the same manner, not only capacity is increased
by increasing the density of the network, but, latency is also reduced due to a
decrease in the overall transmission range. However, it comes at the cost of
backhaul provisioning. Besides, spatial diversity by using multiple antennas is a
viable solution in many cases that could be exploited as in [18].
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• Network slicing: The term Network Slicing means the slicing or splitting of a
physical network into sub-networks. These sub-networks are formed in such a
manner that they are optimized for specified applications, and thus ensure avail-
ability of dedicated resources for verticals, such as V2X, VR. Slicing of net-
works promises to be an essential tool in applications which are heterogeneous
and relate to different requirements.
• Space-Time Block Codes (STBC): This coding technique, especially the Or-
thogonal STBC, is considered as a very successful transmission, diversity tech-
nique. It is because it can achieve complete diversity without invoking transmit-
ter CSI and also does not need combined decoding of multiple symbols. Con-
ventionally, this technique is defined by the number of free symbols (Ns) being
transmitted over time slots (T ). The code rate comes out to be Rc = Ns/T . The
STBC can outperform any other similar approach, such as the Maximum Ratio
Transmission technique, in case of imperfections erupt in the system.
• Proactive Packet Drop: If deep fade occurs, this approach helps in discard-
ing, at the transmitter, those packets which even the maximal transmit of power
cannot successfully transmit. Likewise, whenever a maximum number of re-
transmissions is achieved, the phenomenon of packet drop might prop-up at the
receiver’s end, which is different than eMBB (infinite queue buffers have been
assumed here). This can be remedied by increasing the number of resources
while utilizing spatial diversity.
1.2. Machine Type Communication (MTC)
MTC deals with the type of communications in which machines communicate with
each other autonomously without the need for human interference, also making possi-
ble the communication with and between machines via a mobile network [19]. By the
year 2020, the concept of smart cities (e.g., intercommunication and sensing capabil-
ities between homes, vehicles, lawn mowers) will become highly mainstream. Devel-
opments in MTC and other services are destined to follow an exponential growth scale
which will, in turn, give rise to many new big industries in fields such as health, en-
tertainment, security and so forth. Advancements such as Machine-Type Deployments
will also create many new types of data traffic. These traffic patterns will demand
characteristics such as per-link bit rate, delay, reliability, energy, security. Current
MTC depends on wireless technologies such as Bluetooth, but these work best only
in short-ranges. However, for larger scale applications, wide-ranging connectivity will
be required, such as 5G technologies because of Massive MTC warrants a substan-
tial number (10 times the current number of subscribers at minimum) of connected
devices. This will only be possible if the design, planning, and operation of cellular
networks are transformed in the context of scalability and efficiency, to deal with di-
verse and dense MTD. The need for the deployment of MTC on cellular stems from
the prediction that in the future a large number of devices will operate on MTC. This
makes cellular networks the aptest choice, because its infrastructure, is almost univer-
sal and already in place. Low Power, Wireless LAN systems, and capillary networks
will supplement MTC connectivity [20]. In summary, the phenomena of MTC over
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cellular networks has become a practical reality these days. Many cellular operators
around the world have already offered their subscribers the choice to subscribe to MTC
[21]. Moreover, with the prediction that MTC devices will enjoy exponential growth,
its benefits to the development of 5G technology have been universally recognized.
Furthermore, the 3GPP has already begun working on techniques to standardize MTC
over cellular [22] [23]. The only dilemma facing this technology is the timeline, i.e.,
when will it become a full reality, and what would be the best techniques, designs,
and plans for its implementation. Certain obstacles, both technical and financial, still
need to be sorted out. Although MTC can usher in a new era of economic prosperity
for cellular companies, still it would not be easy to integrate the existing systems of
cellular operators into MTC. A balance between the aspirations of cellular operators,
auxiliary service providers, customers and regulatory bodies is pivotal to the imple-
mentation of MTC. Furthermore, the cost of implementing this system will also have
to be taken into consideration. MTC can also operate by leasing cellular spectrum
from spectrum owners. This makes it possible for mobile virtual network operators
(MVNOs) to benefit from this technology too [20].
1.2.1. MTC Standardization in 3GPP
Technical Requirements: 3GPP radio technologies (for packet data) are in extensive
usage. They can be classified in the following manner: i) from physical characteris-
tics (GPRS using TDMA, HSPA using W-CDMA); ii) LTE systems using OFDMA. In
each release of 3GPP, advancements are made to each of the above. Roaming support
(key to MTC applications which require mobility support), operational capabilities
across multiple platforms and backward compatibility are some of the factors behind
the success of 3GPP. Since 3GPP relies on existing infrastructure, it will have a sub-
stantially low rollout cost. There is but one hiccup; 3GPP technology was designed
with human interactions in mind, and not for machine interactions. They are also
incompatible for MTC networks, especially greenfield developments. Some of the
crucial contests facing MTC operators are terminal costs, IPR, phase-out of old tech-
nologies, terminal power consumption. Optimization of MTC for low-end applications
is also a challenge due to the requirement of maintaining reverse compatibility. It is a
permanent feature of mobile phones that they need regular replacement, but this short-
coming does not mar MTC devices. Furthermore, people are often averse to shifting to
new technology, and making people shift to this new technology will undoubtedly be
challenging [24]. With 3GPP an attempt has been made at standardizing MTC Com-
munication. It is done by focusing on factors such as identification of particular MTC
device, and large-scale adoption of MTC communication (at lower cost and increase
coverage area)[24]. 3GPP has several groups: Radio access RAN, SA, FERAN, and
CT. These groups describe all parameters of 3GPP technologies: interface and require-
ments of 3GPP systems. RAN deals with the radio access properties of 3G, 4G and so
on. GERAN, on the other hand, is relatively primitive as it deals with the same for 2G.
SA is used for the architecture and capabilities of the service. Lastly, CT deals with
terminal interface specifications and the 3GPP systems’ core areas. However, work is
still in progress on 3GPP’s features, and each new feature is released with a study of
its core aspects [24].
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The Need for MTC User Identification: An MTC module comprises two devices,
a subscriber identity module (SIM) card, and an MTC device. MTC user identification
is essential for most solutions offered by 3GPP. It is predicted that the SIM will have
to be integrated on the PCB or have a SIM soldered directly onto the device, for most
MTC subscriptions; but this requirement is not essential. In case of devices that are
not integrated with the SIM, it will be the responsibility of the operator to oversee the
SIM profile or the compatibility of devices. Moreover, it will have to detect any change
in the device’s International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) in case of any misuse
of the SIM card [24]. Whenever the data usage limit is reached, the identification of
the particular MTC user will have to be ascertained to determine the total cost or rate
of usage. Current cellular operators use a similar system of controlling the speed of
mobile data as a means of reducing the price or cost of usage. The MTC system could
implement a variation of the same system, but restricting mobile data may undermine
the capabilities of the MTC systems because they are designed in such a way that
they require the relatively larger volume of mobile data. Moreover, a user may quickly
change their SIM to a non-MTC specified one, in cases where the SIM is not integrated
with the device [24]. A SIM card already contains the International Mobile Subscriber
Mobile (IMSI) of a subscriber which holds the subscribers’ profile and the services
subscribed by that person. The operators can use this information to support MTC
services that are customized to each user based on their requirements of data packets
size, and optimal routing. The operator holds full control of the IMSI of a user and
can therefore chalk-out a pricing policy for the user, based on their preferences, with
relative ease [24].
The Need for Coverage Improvement: MTC has many applications. Few of them
need wide-spread coverage. Mobile MTC users will not be outside of coverage areas
for longer times. However, many MTC applications require fixed terminals, but will
not have fixed line access. Smart metering and vehicle parking meters are a few immo-
bile examples of MTC applications. Those who can provide this universal connectivity
will be able to claim a considerable share of the market. Nowadays, utility metering is
the most apparent and in-demand application of MTC devices. Majority of establish-
ments do not have coverage in their basements, where meters are often located, which
can be remedied by adding base stations, but this comes at the cost of backhaul, ac-
quisition of thesite and rent. Achieving of hundred percent coverage is unrealistic, but
optimum coverage has to be achieved all the while keeping the cost low. Therefore,
it is pertinent to ensure that the total cost of the system is not amplified while striving
to improve coverage. In this connection, the 3GPP proposes improved coverage, with
low intensity, of MTC modules to enable large-scale installation of MTC [21]. Study
of 3GPP has identified multiple features which are redundant for MTC devices. The
main focus is on reducing the complexity of devices and has identified some factors
to that end, such as limiting of device competence to a single receiving RF, restriction
of supported peak data rate, reduction of data bandwidth. However, this simplifica-
tion gives rise to other specification impacts. It requires a fragile balance to operate
this system at optimum performance, while running on standard LTE devices utilizing
additional restrictions of the scheduler [24].
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Service Exposure and Enablement Support: 3GPP is working to facilitate third
parties to help them design third-party services to its customers, by introducing stan-
dardization. Moreover, organizations other than 3GPP are also working on standard-
ization to enable MTC services. Support for operations such as service exposure and
facilitation by 3GPP will sanction the use of 3GPP for operations other than IP-based
data transmission because existing 3GPP networks already provide them, which is
being done by provisioning of more information on transmission, scheduling of infor-
mation, and outlining of new interfaces among 3GPP core networks and application
platforms. All links with UE identity are severed by exposing network information, to
ensure privacy [24] [25].
Hence, MTC adaptation is necessary for any traffic model designed for HTC. It
is pertinent to ask if it would be viable to model large scale, traffic of autonomous
machines, one by one, also known as source traffic modeling, which is better in terms
of accuracy [26].
1.2.2. Security
A new technology, 5G (for IoT, MTC, and URLLC), has extensive use in the commer-
cial, industrial and military sectors; it brings up several challenges. Chief among these
are security and privacy problems. However, traditionally security has been seen to
have limited relation with other communication tasks. Hence, the physical nature of
wireless media is considered impervious to encryption algorithms [27]. Therefore, it
is necessary that it ensures security and privacy of communications. However, despite
these precedents, various studies (for instance [28], [29], [30] and [31]) have shown the
merits of Physical Layer security as a key player in the consolidation of communication
systems. In this regard, the fundamental idea promulgated by Information Theoretic
Security is the combination of encryption with channel coding techniques, which helps
in ensuring the security of communication, due to the communication channel’s ran-
domness, from any spying or snooping activity. We further discuss security in Chapter
2.
1.2.3. Thesis Contribution
This thesis focus on providing the solution to avoid eavesdropping and provide ways
to quantify security and reliability. We study a scenario in which the transmitter Alice
sends data to receiver Bob, in the existence of an experienced eavesdropper Eve, All of
them are equipped with multiple antennas. Alice is perceived as a base station and Bob
as a cellular user, in the context of a cellular network. Eve is operating with a slightly
more complex device as compared to Bob, and resultantly might have access to private
information. A low cost and less complex system for utilizing the spatial density in
multiple antenna scheme, i.e., Transmit antenna selection (TAS), is employed by Alice
on the main channel. Bob and Eve are utilizing an optimum Maximum Ratio Combin-
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ing (MRC) scheme. Similarly, it is also assumed that Alice, Bob and Eve can estimate
their own channel state information (CSI). This thesis attempts to show that in the
multi-antenna environment, if a low cost and complexity single RF chain transmitter
is used, the PHY security can be substantially increased, regardless of the capabilities
or complexity of the eavesdroppers’receiver.
1.2.4. Thesis Outline
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: in Chapter 2, we define a scenario where
Alice (the transmitter) communicates with a Bob (the receiver) in the presence of Eve
(the eavesdropper). We discuss the already derived old and new secrecy outage proba-
bility formulation for SISOSE scenario. In Chapter 3, we obtain closed-form expres-
sions of secrecy outage probability for MISOSE, MISOME, MIMOSE and MIMOME
scenarios. After that, in Chapter 4, we analyze the secrecy outage probability as a func-
tion of the rate of confidential information, average SNR of the legitimate channel and
average SNR of wiretap channel. We also analyze the reliability. Finally, we present
our conclusions and suggest future work in Chapter 5.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Currently, cryptography is utilized for security purposes and employed at upper layers
of communication protocols with the assumption of eavesdropper’s limited compu-
tational power: However, it is superficial and can be countered with advanced anti-
cryptographic techniques/software. However, in today’s world where computational
power of devices grow in an exponential pattern, this technique is not viable. Further-
more, these security techniques require maintenance, distribution and constant chang-
ing of encryption codes, which is a time-consuming process and can lead to over-
burdening of limited resources. Lightweight cryptography and physical later security
promise to be far more superior concerning achieving tight security against any level
of computational power. Contemporary studies on MTC have focused upon MAC or
ULA, which are used in the field such as energy management, entertainment systems.
However, physical layer security has a pivotal role in MTC [32]. Since MTC com-
munications services are defined by low power consumption, low data rate, and low
mobility, this enables them to be applicable in home area networks, because of their
ability for low mobility, small data transmission, group-centric communication[33].
Furthermore, physical layer security can also be used to enhance the security of loca-
tion sharing and incrementing the upper-layers of security algorithms. Current Physi-
cal Layer Security Techniques have been divided into following five major categories:
i) Power; ii) Theoretical Secure Capacity; iii) Code; iv) Channel and; v) Signal De-
tection Methods. It would be helpful to investigate as to whether the physical layer
channel can assist the upper-layer security designs.
First hand, Physical Layer Security is not a novel concept, but re-merged in the
recent years due to advancement in signal processing and information theory. In re-
cent years a lot of research has been undertaken in Physical Layer Security, which has
opened the possibility of new avenues in terms of designing, wireless communication
networks which are are more susceptible to interception. On the other hand, due to its
open nature wireless communication systems offer greater security through collabora-
tion among different networks. The information theoretic security at the physical layer
has reemerged to overcome the essential issues of cryptographic methods employed
at upper layers of communication protocols, where cryptographic methods have an
assumption of limited computational power at the eavesdropper [34] [35]. The draw-
back of cryptographic techniques is ignoring the relative location of network elements,
physical properties of the wireless medium and actual transmitted information [34]
[35]. Information-theoretic security compliments cryptography by adding privacy and
reliability at lower layer [35]. Therefore, the design potential of Information-theoretic
security can match the increasing computational powers of interceptors. Physical layer
security is expected to introduce new ways to increase security and decrease the com-
plexity of conventional cryptography as far as it is built to be protected and quantifiable
(in confidential bps/Hz), in spite of the eavesdropper’s computational power[35]. As
making secure wireless communication system is of paramount importance, the com-
munication system ought to have a vigilant eye on eavesdropper who tries to intercept
the communication between a legitimate pair of transmitter and receiver unreliable.
Due to advancement in research, the possibility to have secure communication between
legitimate pair even in the presence of eavesdropper has enhanced. In 1949 Shannon
introduced the concept of physical security in his pioneering work [36]. Later on, in
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1975, Wyner put forward in [37] the wire-tap channel where the eavesdropper tries to
breach the confidential information based on a degraded version of the legitimate link
signal. They showed that there are in existence some channel codes, which can en-
sure error-free transmissions and discretion. It has been proved in [38] that the secrecy
capacity (i.e., the maximum transmission rate at which the eavesdropper is unable to
decode any information) is equal to the difference between any two channels capaci-
ties, provided that both the channels are additive white Gaussian Noise channels and
the capacity of later is less than that of the former. Hence, confidential communi-
cation is possible only when the SNR of the Gaussian Main Channel is superior to
the Gaussian Wiretap Channel. With the generic idea of securing wireless transmis-
sions, in paper [27] they have focused on the effects of fading on secrecy capacity.
The contributions made in [27] are: i) Information theoretic formulation for securing
wireless communication; ii) secrecy capacity of single-antenna quasi-static Rayleigh
fading channels, its characterization, and outage probabilities; iii) analyzing the effects
of user location on secrecy; iv) detailed comparative study of a Gaussian wiretap and
benefits of fading. Among other things, the most important deduction of study in [27]
is that when fading is introduced still secrecy is achieved even if the eavesdropper’s
channel has better SNR than the main channel.
2.1. Conventional Secrecy Outage Probability
We examine the setup in Figure 2.1, where Alice is a legitimate user who sends mes-
sage w to another user known as Bob. The encoded codeword xn = [x(1), ..., x(n)]
of message block w is transmitted over discrete-time Rayleigh fading channel. The
output of discrete-time Rayleigh fading channel (main channel) is
yB(i) = hB(i)x(i) + nB(i),
Where hB(i) is the time-varying complex fading coefficient, it also refers to as chan-
nel state information (CSI) which is independent of channel output and nB(i) indicates
the zero-mean circularly symmetric complex Gaussian noise. We suppose quasi-static
fading where fading coefficient are constant for all channel uses i.e hB(i), ∀i.
Encoder decoder
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Alice Bob
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Figure 2.1: Example of wireless network with potential eavesdropper
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A third party, known as Eve, who is competently eavesdropping the communication
between Alice and Bob by observing an independent Rayleigh channel output
yE(i) = hE(i)x(i) + nE(i),
with quasi-static fading coefficient hE(i) = hE, ∀i and nE(i) represents zero-mean
circularly symmetric complex Gaussian noise.[27]
Note that we have power-limited channel in the sense that
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[
|X(i)|2
]
≤ P
where P denotes average transmit signal power and E[·] denotes expectation. More-
over main channel’s noise power and wiretap channel’s noise power is represented by
NB and NE respectively. Then, The Instantaneous SNR at Bob is as follows
γB(i) =
P |hB(i)|2
NB
=
P |hB|2
NB
The average SNR expression is
γB(i) =
PE|hB(i)|2
NB
=
P |hB|2
NB
= γB
Similarly, the instantaneous SNR expression at Eve is given by
γE(i) =
P |hE(i)|2
NE
= γE
and average SNR
γE(i) =
PE|hE(i)|2
NE
= γE
The instantaneous SNR γ ∝ |h|2 is exponentially distributed as channel fading coeffi-
cients h are zero-mean complex Gaussian random variables. Specifically, PDF of SNR
at Bob and Eve are, respectively
p (γB) =
1
γB
exp
(
−γB
γB
)
, γB > 0 (1)
p (γE) =
1
γE
exp
(
−γE
γE
)
, γE > 0 (2)
In [27] it is assumed perfect CSI between Alice and Bob in the main channel, but no
CSI between Alice and Eve. Eve, in turn, has CSI and can estimate it’s own chan-
nel. Furthermore, the authors in [27] characterize the secrecy capacity of a quasi-static
fading channel. Authors supposed Gaussian wiretap channel with the assumption of
communication between Alice and Bob over a standard additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) channel with noise power NB and NB > NE , in that case, Eve’s observation
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is corrupted, which means Bob’s receiver has better SNR than Eve’s. The power is
limited as 1
n
∑n
i=1 E[|X(i)|2] 6 P. The secrecy capacity is
Cs = CB − CE, (3)
where CB represents capacity of main channel while CE indicates the capacity of
Eavesdropper’s channel. Their expressions are as follow.
CB =
1
2
log
(
1 +
P
NB
)
CE =
1
2
log
(
1 +
P
NE
)
The secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel is given as
Cs = log
(
1 +
P
NB
)
− log
(
1 +
P
NE
)
,
per complex dimension. As hB and hE are quasi-static channel coefficients, then the
instantaneous capacity of legitimate and eavesdropper channels are, respectively,
CB =
1
2
log
(
1 +
P |hB|2
NB
)
. (4)
CE =
1
2
log
(
1 +
P |hE|2
NE
)
. (5)
On the basis of non-negativity of channel capacity, the secrecy capacity can be written
as
Cs =

log (1 + γB)− log (1 + γE) ifγB > γE
0 ifγB ≤ γE
(6)
In (4) it shows that when γB > γE, the secrecy capacity is positive and is zero when
γB ≤ γE. As the main channel and Eavesdropper’s channel are independent of each
other and knowing the probability density functions given by (1), (2) of exponentially
distributed random variables γB and γE , the probability of the existence of non-zero
secrecy capacity can be written as [27].
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Pr (Cs > 0)
(a)
= Pr (γB > γE) =
∫ ∞
0
∫ γB
0
P (γB, γE) dγEdγB
(a)
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ γB
0
P (γB)P (γE) dγEdγB
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ γB
0
1
γB
exp
(
−γB
γB
)
1
γE
exp
(
−γE
γE
)
dγEdγB
=
∫ ∞
0
− 1
γB
exp
(
−γB
γB
)[
exp
(
−γB
γE
)
− 1
]
dγB
=
∫ ∞
0
− 1
γB
[
exp
(
−γB
γB
− γB
γE
)
− exp
(
−γB
γB
)]
dγB
=
∫ ∞
0
−
[
1
γB
+
1
γE
]−1[
exp
(
−γB
γB
− γB
γE
)
+ γB exp
(
−γB
γB
)]
dγB
= − 1
γB
[
γB.γE
γE + γB
]
− 1
γB
(γB)
=
γB
γB + γE
(7)
Where (a) comes from assuming that legitimate and eavesdropper channels are inde-
pendent. Notice that (7) can also be written in another way from user location point of
view, where the distance between Alice and Bob is represented by dB, and the distance
between Alice and Eavesdropper by dE . Noting that γB ∝ dαB and γE ∝ dαE , α indi-
cates the pathloss component. So the probability of the existence of non-zero secrecy
capacity is given by
Pr (Cs > 0) =
1
1 +
(
dB
dE
)α , (8)
when γB  γE or (dB  dW ) then Pr (Cs > 0) ≈ 1 or Pr (Cs = 0) ≈ 0.
Next, we are able to define the secrecy outage probability as the probability that secrecy
capacity is below a target secrecy rate, thus
Pout(Rs) = Pr (Cs < Rs) ,
such that the secrecy rateRs > 0. The operational importance of secrecy outage proba-
bility is that when setting the secrecy rate Rs Alice considers wiretap channel capacity
is given by C ′E = CB − Rs. Eve’s channel will be worse than Alice’s estimate if
Rs > Cs, i.e., CE < C ′E , Alice uses wiretap codes and these codes will provide per-
fect secrecy. Otherwise information secrecy is compromised if Rs > Cs.
In [27] authors derived the closed form equation for single input single output single
eavesdropper (SISOSE) scenario, as follow
Pout(Rs) = Pr (Cs < Rs|γB > γE) Pr (γB > γE)+Pr (Cs < Rs|γB ≤ γE) Pr (γB ≤ γE) ,
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where,
Pr (γB≤γE)=1− Pr (γB>γE)=
γE
γB+γE
,
which comes from (7). On the other hand
Pr (Cs < Rs|γB > γE) = Pr (log (1 + γB)− log (1 + γE) < Rs|γB > γE) ,
= Pr
(
γB < 2
Rs (1 + γE)− 1|γB > γE
)
,
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ 2Rs (1+γE)−1
0
Pr (γB, γE|γB > γE) dγEdγB,
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ 2Rs (1+γE)−1
0
Pr (γB) Pr (γE)
Pr (γB > γE)
dγEdγB,
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ 2Rs (1+γE)−1
0
1
γB
exp
(
− γB
γB
)
1
γE
exp
(
− γE
γE
)
γB
γB+γE
dγEdγB,
=
γB + γE
γB
.
1
γE
∫ ∞
0
(−1) exp
(
−γE
γE
− 2
Rs (1 + γE)− 1
γB
)
− exp
(
−γE
γE
− γE
γB
)
dγE,
=
γB + γE
γBγE
[(
γB + 2
RsγB
γEγB
)−1(
− exp
(
−2
Rs − 1
γB
))
+
γE.γB
γE + γB
]
=
[
γB + γE
γBγE
(
γEγB
γB + 2
RsγB
)(
− exp
(
−2
Rs − 1
γB
))]
+
[
γE.γB
γE + γB
.
γE + γB
γE.γB
]
= 1−
(
γB + γE
γB + 2
RsγB
)
exp
(
−2
Rs − 1
γB
)
(9)
where (a) in (9) comes from substituting (1) and (2) into (7), and since
Rs > 0 =⇒ Pr (Cs < Rs|γB ≤ γE) = 1
Secrecy outage for single antenna case (SISOSE) is
Pout(Rs) = 1−
(
γB
γB + 2
RsγE
)
exp
(
−2
Rs − 1
γB
)
. (10)
Examining the secrecy outage probability asymptotic behavior of secrecy rate Rs .
If Rs → 0, (10) becomes
Pout(Rs)→
γE
γB + γE
and when Rs → ∞ then Pout(Rs) → 1, such that it’s not possible for Alice and Bob
to communicate secretly at very high rates. When γE  γB, then (10) reduces to.
Pout(Rs) = 1− exp
(
−2
Rs − 1
γB
)
and in high SNR regime as Pout ≈
(
2Rs − 1
)
/γB, otherwise when γB  γE , Pout ≈
1, and it’s impossibe for confidential communication to occur.
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Figure 2.2: Outage probability versus γB, for a normalized secrecy rate equal to 0.1
and for selected values of γE . AWGN channel capacity effects Normalization with
SNR equal to γB
Figure 2.2 shows the secrecy outage probability versus γB for different values of
γE and normalized target secrecy rate, Rs = 0.1. for the single antenna at all nodes.
It is observed that higher γB minimizes the outage probability, and higher γE maxi-
mizes the outage probability. Furthermore the outage probability decomposes as 1
γB
if
γB  γE. Conversely, outage probability proceed towards 1 if γE  γB.
Since γB ∝ dαB and γE ∝ dαE , thus (11) can be written as
Pout(Rs) = 1−


(
1
(dB)
α
)
(
1
(dB)
α
)
+
(
1
(dE)
α
)
2Rs

 exp
(
−2
Rs − 1
γB
)
= 1−


(
1
(dB)
α
)
(dB)
α (dE)
α
(dE)
α + (dB)
α 2Rs

 exp
(
−2
Rs − 1
γB
)
= 1−

 1
1−
(
dE
dB
)−α
2Rs

 exp
(
−2
Rs − 1
γB
)
(11)
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Figure 2.3: Outage probability versus dE/dB, for a secrecy rate equal to 0.1 and for
selected values of γB
In Figure 2.3, the effect of distance ratio on the performance is demonstrated for
normalized target secrecy rate equal to 1 and for some selected values of γB. where α =
3. When dE
dB
→∞, then Pout(Rs) = 1−exp
(
−2Rs−1
γB
)
and if dE
dB
→ 0 then Pout(Rs) =
1. Authors in [27] disclosed that even when eavesdropper has better average SNR
than the legitimate user, still perfectly secure communication over wireless channel is
possible to occur.
2.2. Secrecy Outage Probability - Revised Formulation
In [39] a study of information-theoretic security has been made without any knowledge
of the fading state of the eavesdropper’s channel, and an alternative secrecy outage for-
mula is presented, which is used to calculate the probability of a message transmission
fails in achieving perfect secrecy. This formulation has been used to design a couple
of transmission schemes which not only fulfill the required security requirements but
also provide better throughput performance. The obstacle of providing information-
theoretic security on wireless networks, without the information of the eavesdropper’s
CSI is a growing point of concern these days. Furthermore, through the provision of
a probabilistic performance measure of how secure communication is, outage based
characterization is the more appropriate approach. Under this context, [40] portrays
an idea of secrecy outage. Closed-form expressions are presented the probability of
having a secure and reliable transmission [40][41]. This formulation, however, fails to
provide a direct signal of the system’s security level; because, it only reads the out-
age events, which are not, bound to show the failures in obtaining perfect secrecy. In
[39], an alternate method of formulation is presented, which provides a more thorough
measure of the system’s security. It does so by evaluating design parameters such as
the transmission rate of code words and the circumstances in which this transmission
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happens. In order to calculate the probability of how secure transmission is against
eavesdropping, this formulation is better than most in terms of the framework it pro-
vides. Using this formulation two new transmission schemes have been introduced
which ensure a substantial level of security and give maximum throughput. First of
these schemes, needs CSI feedback from the receiver (legitimate) to the transmitter,
while the other only needs 1 bit of feedback. It has been assumed that the transmission
of secret information is being made from Alice to Bob on a Rayleigh fading channel,
while an eavesdropper, Eve, tries to intercept the message. They have also assumed
that P , the transmission power, is set to maximum. The channel gain from Alice to
Bob is hb and from Alice to Eve is he, Both are assumed to experience independent
quasi-static fading, and receiver experiences AWGN noise. It has been assumed that
both Bob and Eve have knowledge of their own channels. Nonetheless, since Alice
is oblivious to Eve’s instantaneous CSI, therefore complete secrecy is impossible to
achieve. A substitute secrecy outage formulation for calculating the probability that a
transmission has failed to achieve complete secrecy is provided in [39].
In Wyner’s encoding scheme, two rates are chosen by the encoder, i.e., the rate of
codewords transmitted Rb, and the rate of secret information Rs. Now, Re , Rb − Rs
shows the rate of securing the transmission against eavesdropping. Bob will correctly
decode the information if Cb > Rb; however, it will be impossible to achieve perfect
secrecy if Ce > Re. Therefore, the probability of secrecy outage is defined as the
conditional probability [39].
pso , P (Ce > Rb −Rs|message−transmission) (12)
being conditioned on the actual transmission of the message. Their secrecy outage
formulation considers design parameters as well the design parameters are taken into
consideration are: transmitted codewords, and the conditions of transmission; resul-
tantly a more stringent security metric is provided.
In [42] it is shown that whenever a transmission is successfully conducted (on the con-
dition that Alice is oblivious to Bob’s CSI) the probability of secrecy outage is turned
into unconditional probability i.e. Pr (Ce > Rb −Rs). On the other hand, if Bob’s
Channel instantaneous CSI is available to Alice, a decision can be made by Alice re-
garding the sending of transmission depending on the channel condition, which has
great significance because if the design of transmission condition is taken carefully,
the probability of outage secrecy can be reduced substantially. This novel formulation
is beneficial to the designer who can use the probability of secrecy outage to indicate
the level of security and design the schemes of transmission according to the system
requirements.
In [39] authors considered a scenario in which an encoder is capable of adaptively
choosing the transmitted codeword rate (Rb) according to Bob’s Channel instantaneous
CSI. In reality, the instantaneous SNR γb needs to be fed from Bob to Alice. The
reliability can be assessed as
ptx = Pr (γb > µ) = exp (−µ/γb) (13)
26
Also, the secrecy outage probability closed form equation can be derived as following.
pso = Pr (Ce > Cb −Rs|γb > µ)
= Pr (log2 (1 + γe) > log2 (1 + γb)−Rs|γb > µ)
= Pr
(
Rs > log2
(
1 + γb
1 + γe
)
|γb > µ
)
=
Pr
(
µ < γB < 2
Rs (1 + γe)− 1
)
P (γb > µ)
= exp
(
µ
γb
)∫ ∞
µ+1
2Rs
−1
∫ 2Rs (γe)−1
µ
Pr (γB) Pr (γE) dγEdγB
= exp
(
µ
γB
)∫ ∞
µ+1
2Rs
−1
∫ 2Rs (γe)−1
µ
1
γB
exp
(
−γB
γB
)
1
γe
exp
(
−γE
γE
)
dγEdγB
=
1
γE
exp
(
µ
γB
)∫ ∞
µ+1
2Rs
−1
exp
(
− µ
γE
− γE
γE
)
exp
(
−γE
γE
− 2
Rs (1 + γE)− 1
γB
)
dγE
=
1
γE
exp
(
µ
γB
)∫ ∞
µ+1
2Rs
−1
[(
−1
γE
)−1(−1
γE
)
exp
(
− µ
γE
− γE
γE
)]
−
[(
−2Rs
γB
− 1
γE
)−1(−2Rs
γB
− 1
γE
)
exp
(
−γE
γE
− 2
Rs (1 + γE)− 1
γB
)]
dγE
=
1
γE
exp
(
µ
γB
)[
exp
(
−µ2RsγE − γBµ− γB + 2RsγB
2RsγE.γB
)]
[
γE
(
−2RsγE − γB
)
+ γEγB
−2RsγE − γB
]
=
(
2RsγE
2RsγE + γB
)
exp
(
µ
γB
)[
exp
(
−µ2RsγE − γBµ− γB + 2RsγB
2RsγE.γB
)]
=
(
2RsγE
2RsγE + γB
)[
exp
(
−µγB − γB + 2RsγB
2RsγE.γB
)]
=
(
2RsγE
2RsγE + γB
)[
exp
(
−µ+ 1− 2RsγB
2RsγE
)]
(14)
The new formulation in (14) is the secrecy outage probability for SISOSE scenario.
Besides (13) can be used to calculate the transmission probability of any value of
Rs (µ). A trade-off between Security and QoS is given by the on-off transmission’s
SNR threshold µ, By choosing a greater µ more stringent security can be achieved. It
has been shown that Ptx and Pso are dependent on µ and Rs.
In Figure 2.4 the probability of secrecy outage is shown, by comparing the al-
ready available formulation of [27] and the newly presented formulation in (14). Both
the above cases have the same rate of transmitted codewords of adaptively chosen
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Figure 2.4: Comparison between old and new secrecy outage formulation
Rb = Cb. The maximum Outage probability for the new formulation is achieved by
setting the on-off SNR threshold to the minimum value of µ = 2Rs−1. It is clear from
the figure for two different values of γB that both the formulations have noticeably dif-
ferent outage probabilities. Therefore, the security levels cannot be measured directly
through the old formulation.
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3. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF TAS-MRC UNDER MULTI
ANTENNA EAVESDROPPER
In this chapter, we introduce the system model and closed-form solution of a multiple
antenna system operating in the presence of eavesdroppers. In chapter 2, we have re-
visited key metrics for performance analysis, namely secrecy outage probability, in two
different formulations. Therein, we build on the top of those and provide closed-form
solutions for multiple antenna system. Alice, Bob, and Eve all are able to estimate their
own channel state information (CSI). Building on [43] and [44], in which a scheme is
introduced that permits only Bob to benefit from transmissions of Alice, thereby re-
ducing Eve’s attack capabilities; we assume that all nodes utilize multiple antennas.
However, Bob and Eve employ MRC whilst Alice performs TAS.
In our contribution, we extend the results of [44] and [39] by
• Assuming the performance of a multiple antenna wiretap channel;
• Providing generalized secrecy outage probability in closed-form;
• Providing simple closed-form expressions for the generalized secrecy outage
probability of MIMOME, MIMOSE, and MISOME wiretap channels;
3.1. System Model
We consider a multiple antenna wiretap channel scenario, in which a legitimate pair
communicates in the presence of an eavesdropper. Alice (the transmitter) has NA an-
tennas while Bob (the receiver) has NB antennas.The untrusted, Eve (the eavesdrop-
per), has NE antennas and is attempting to intercept the transmission originating from
Alice, as shown in Figure 3.1
The communication on the legitimate link is represented by the black line, while the
red arrow shows Eve’s link. However, both Bob and Alice share an open and error-free
feedback channel, which is utilized to carry Alice’s antenna index with optimum SNR
and to allow for on-off transmission. In the case Eve obtains this feedback or knows
the index of the antenna, Eve is not able to exploit such information and therefore it
has no diversity gain. As legitimate and eavesdropper channels are not correlated Eve
is unable to manipulate diversity from Alice’s antennas.
3.1.1. Transmission Protocol and Encoding Scheme
Bob is scheduled and requests Alice to start its transmission. This request is performed
through an open and error-free feedback channel, which not only carries the signaling
to start the transmission but the antenna index.
The capacity of legitimate link isCb and eavesdropper link isCe as described in chapter
2. Subsequently, Bob selects two rates namely transmission rate Rb and confidential
rate Rs. Then, the cost of securing any transmission is Re = Rb − Rs [39],[45]. Re-
sultantly, to ensure reliability and secrecy two scenarios are presented: i) Information
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hAB
hAE
Figure 3.1: Illustrative example of network deployment: Alice utilizes TAS while Bob
and Eve employ MRC, But only Bob can make use of diversity from Alice’s antennas
leakage occurs if Ce > Re; and ii) the message is successfully decoded at Bob when-
ever Cb > Rb [39],[45].
3.1.2. Legitimate and Eavesdropper Channel Models
In this case, it is assumed that all channels coefficients are independent and squared-
envelope is exponentially distributed. In order to get maximum SNR at Bob, a single
transmit antenna is selected at Alice, and then Bob employs MRC. The best antenna’s
index has been defined as i∗ as follow
i∗ = argmax
1≤ i ≤NA
||hiB||, (15)
where NB × 1 channel vector is represented by hiB = [hi1, hi2, · · · , hiNB ]
T between
the i-th transmit antenna at Alice and the NB antennas at Bob with independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) Rayleigh fading, and || · ||, (x)T denote the Euclidean
norm and transpose operations.
Then, the message is encoded into the codeword x = [x(1, · · · , x(i), · · · , x(n))] by
Alice, using the aforementioned Wyner code [46] and the transmitted codeword is
bound by power constraint that 1
n
∑n
i=1 E [|x(i)|2] ≤ PA, where PA indicates transmit
power of Alice, Then Bob exploits MRC to combine signal vectors, which produces
the received signal at time i as follow, and (x)† denote conjugate transpose operation.
yB(i) = h
†
ABhABx(i) + h
†
ABnAB, (16)
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where legitimate channel vector is represented by hAB = hi∗B, the NB × 1 additive
white Gaussian noise vector at Bob is nAB , we suppose E
[
nABn
†
AB
]
= INBσ
2
AB , with
σ2AB being the noise variance at each antenna, while INB is a m × m identity matrix.
Thus, the instantaneous SNR of the legitimate link from (16) is
γB =
||hAB||2PA
σ2AB
, (17)
Probability density function (PDF) and cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a
given random variable X are denoted as fX(x) and FX(x), respectively, as in [47]
fγB(γ) =
NA γ
NB−1
Γ(NB) γ
NE
B
exp
(
− γ
γB
)
P
(
NB ,
γ
γB
)NA−1
, (18)
FγB(γ) = P
(
NB ,
γ
γB
)NA
. (19)
It is clear from (18) and (19) that diversity of Alice’s and Bob’s numerous antennas
is exploited by the legitimate channel. While Eve can only utilize its own antenna’s
diversity because it perceives a random TAS scheme. As a result, the eavesdropped
signal vector using MRC is combined by Eve at time i : as follow
yE(i) = h
†
ABhAEx(i) + h
†
AEnAE, (20)
where eavesdropper channel vector is represented by hAE = hi∗E , the NE×1 additive
white Gaussian noise vector at Eve is nAE , we suppose E
[
nAEn
†
AE
]
= INEσ
2
AE , with
σ2AE being the noise variance at each antenna. All channels undergo Rayleigh fading,
likewise to the legitimate link. Thus, the instantaneous SNR of the eavesdropper link
from (20) is
γE =
||hAE||2PA
σ2AE
, (21)
which follows Gamma distribution, and its PDF and CDF are given respectively as
[47]
fγE(γ) =
γNE−1
Γ(NE) γ
NE
E
exp
(
− γ
γE
)
, (22)
FγE(γ) = P
(
NE ,
γ
γE
)
(23)
3.2. Secrecy Outage Probability
It is clear from the above discussion that two basic conditions can be manipulated
to ensure reliability and security [39], [46]. In the context of reliability, the channel
capacity has to be higher than the transmission rate. Hence, Cb > Rb, which ensures
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that the message is decoded. Therefore, the probability of successful transmissions for
this scheme is defined as
ps(µ) = Pr [Cb > Rb] = Pr [γB > µ]
= 1− FγB(µ) (24)
where FγB(·) is given in (19) and µ ≥ 2Rs − 1 because a transmission only occurs
when Cb > Rs. We resort to a secrecy outage probability metric introduced in [39],
which is conditioned on a successful transmission at the legitimate channel. Thus, the
secrecy outage is defined as
pso
4
= Pr [Ce > Cb −Rs|γB > µ] , (25)
=
Pr
[
µ < γB < 2
Rs(1 + γE)− 1
]
ps(µ)
(26)
=
∫ ∞
(1+µ)
2Rs
−1
FγB
(
2Rs(1 + γE)− 1
)
fγE(γE)dγE
1− FγB(µ)
−
(
1− FγE
(
(1+µ)
2Rs
− 1
))
FγB (µ)
1− FγB (µ)
, (27)
where (27) holds when assuming independent random variables.
3.2.1. Generalized MIMOME Scenario
In this section, we get the closed-form expression of secrecy outage probability for
MIMOME scenario. We solve (27) with respect to instantaneous SNR γE at Eve.
Where the term on the right hand side of (27) becomes
(
1− FγE
(
(1+µ)
2Rs
− 1
))
FγB (µ)
1− FγB (µ)
=
1
ps(µ)
Q
(
NE,−
2Rs − 1− µ
2RsγE
)
P
(
NB,
µ
γB
)NA
.
(28)
Gamma function is defined as Γ(z)[48 ,Ch 6, 6.1.1], while the regularized lower in-
complete gamma function is denoted as P (s, z) = γ(s,z)
Γ(z)
[48 ,Ch 6, 6.5.1] and regu-
larized upper incomplete gamma function is denoted as Q (s, z) = γ(s,z)
Γ(z)
[48 ,Ch 26.4,
26.4.19]
Then, the integral in (27) can be defined as
I =
∫ ∞
(1+µ)
2Rs
−1
FγB
(
2Rs(1 + γE)− 1
)
fγE(γE)dγE
1− FγB(µ)
(29)
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(a)
=
∫ ∞
(1+µ)
2Rs
−1
P
(
NB,
(2Rs(1 + γE)− 1
γB
)NA γNE−1E
Γ(NE) γ
NE
E
exp
(
−γE
γE
)
dγE
(b)
=
∫ ∞
(1+µ)
2Rs
−1
Γ(NB)− Γ(NB) exp
(
− (2
Rs (1+γE)−1
γB
)∑NB−1
k=0
(
(2Rs (1+γE)−1
γB
)k
1
k!
Γ(NB)

NA
γNE−1E
Γ(NE) γ
NE
E
exp
(
−γE
γE
)
dγE,
(c)
=
∫ ∞
(1+µ)
2Rs
−1
(
1− exp
(
−(2
Rs(1 + γE)− 1
γB
)NB−1∑
t=0
(
(2Rs(1 + γE)− 1
γB
)t
1
t!
)NA
γNE−1E
Γ(NE) γ
NE
E
exp
(
−γE
γE
)
dγE,
Where (a) comes after replacing (19) and (22) into (29), then with the help of [48 ,Ch 6,
6.5.1] we write (b), and after further simplification, we attain (c). Next, after applying
binomial expansion in (c) we attain (d)
(d)
=
NA∑
K=0
(
NA
K
)
(−1)K
∫ ∞
(1+µ)
2Rs
−1
exp
(
−(2
Rs(1 + γE)− 1
γB
)K
(
NB−1∑
t=0
(
(2Rs(1 + γE)− 1
γB
)t
1
t!
)K
γNE−1E
Γ(NE) γ
NE
E
exp
(
−γE
γE
)
dγE
(e)
=
NA∑
K=0
(
NA
K
)
(−1)K
∫ ∞
(1+µ)
2Rs
−1
exp
(
−(2
Rs(1 + γE)− 1
γB
)K
(
1 +
1
1!
(
(2Rs(1 + γE)− 1
γB
)1
+ ....+
1
(NB − 1)!
(
(2Rs(1 + γE)− 1
γB
)NB−1)K
γNE−1E
Γ(NE) γ
NE
E
exp
(
−γE
γE
)
dγE
(f)
=
NA∑
K=0
(
NA
K
)
(−1)K
∫ ∞
(1+µ)
2Rs
−1
exp
(
−K(2
Rs(1 + γE)− 1
γB
)
∑
s0+s1+s2+..sNB−1=K
(
K
s0, s1, s2, .., sNB−1
)NB−1∏
t=0
(
1
t!
)st (
(2Rs(1 + γE)− 1
γB
)st∗t
γNE−1E
Γ(NE) γ
NE
E
exp
(
−γE
γE
)
dγE
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Note that in (e) we expand the inner summation and in (f) we apply multinomial the-
orem. Next, we simplify (f) and apply the binomial expansion into
(
(2Rs (1+γE)−1
γB
)st∗t
as follows
(g)
=
NA∑
K=0
(
NA
K
)
(−1)K
∫ ∞
(1+µ)
2Rs
−1
exp
(
−K(2
Rs − 1)
γB
)
exp
(
−K(2
RsγE)
γB
)
∑
s0+s1+s2+..+sNB−1=K
(
K
s0, s1, s2, .., sNB−1
)NB−1∏
t=0
(
1
t!
)st((
2Rs − 1
γB
)
+
(
2RsγE
γB
))st∗t
γNE−1E
Γ(NE) γ
NE
E
exp
(
−γE
γE
)
dγE
(h)
=
NA∑
K=0
(
NA
K
)
(−1)K
∫ ∞
(1+µ)
2Rs
−1
exp
(
−K(2
Rs − 1)
γB
)
exp
(
−K(2
RsγE)
γB
)
∑
s0+s1+..+sNB−1=K
(
K
s0, s1, .., sNB−1
)NB−1∏
t=0
(
1
t!
)st st∗t∑
p=0
(
st ∗ t
p
)(
2Rs − 1
γB
)st∗t−p(2RsγE
γB
)p
γNE−1E
Γ(NE) γ
NE
E
exp
(
−γE
γE
)
dγE
And after some simplification, we obtain
(i)
=
NA∑
K=0
(
NA
K
)
(−1)K exp
(
−K(2
Rs − 1)
γB
) ∑
s0+s1+..sNB−1=K
(
K
s0, s1, .., sNB−1
)
NB−1∏
t=0
(
1
t!
)st st∗t∑
p=0
(
st ∗ t
p
)(
2Rs − 1
γB
)st∗t−p 1
Γ(NE) γ
NE
E∫ ∞
(1+µ)
2Rs
−1
exp
(
−K(2
RsγE)
γB
)(
2Rs
γB
)p
(γE)
p γNE−1E exp
(
−γE
γE
)
dγE
(30)
Finally thus last integral is solved as follows
I2 =
∫ ∞
(1+µ)
2Rs
−1
exp
(
−K(2
RsγE)
γB
)(
2Rs
γB
)p
(γE)
p γNE−1E exp
(
−γE
γE
)
dγE
=
∫ ∞
(1+µ)
2Rs
−1
γp+NE−1E exp
(
−K(2
RsγE)
γB
− γE
γE
)
dγE
=
∫ ∞
(1+µ)
2Rs
−1
γp+NE−1E exp
(
−γE
(
K2RsγE + γB
)
γEγB
)
dγE
=
(
K2RsγE + γB
γBγE
)−p−NE
Γ
[
(p+NE) ,
(
K2RsγE + γB
γBγE
)(
µ+ 1− 2Rs
−2RsγE
)]
(31)
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By substituting (31) into (30), and putting (30), (24) and (28) into (27) we attain the
closed form of secrecy outage probability of the MIMOME wiretap channel, where
Alice employs TAS while Bob and Eve perform MRC.
pso =
NA∑
K=0
(
NA
K
)
(−1)K
1− ps(µ)
exp
(
−K(2
Rs − 1)
γB
) ∑
s0+s1+..sNB−1=K
(
K
s0, s1, .., sNB−1
)
NB−1∏
t=0
(
1
t!
)st st∗t∑
p=0
(
st ∗ t
p
)(
2Rs − 1
γB
)st∗t−p(2Rs
γB
)p
1
Γ(NE) γ
NE
E(
K2RsγE + γB
γBγE
)−p−NE
Γ
[
(p+NE) ,
(
K2RsγE + γB
γBγE
)(
µ+ 1− 2Rs
−2RsγE
)]
− 1
ps(µ)
Q
(
NE,−
2Rs − 1− µ
2RsγE
)
P
(
NB,
µ
γB
)NA
(32)
3.2.2. MISOME Scenario
For MISOME scenario, Bob is a single antenna device; thus the only source of spatial
diversity in the legitimate link comes from Alice antennas. Next, we evaluate three
useful variations of the MIMOME scenario, for which we provide a simpler closed-
solution. Taking (27) into account and simplifying (19) for NB = 1 we have
I =
∫ ∞
(1+µ)
2Rs
−1
P
(
NB,
(2Rs(1 + γE)− 1
γB
)NA γNE−1E
Γ(NE) γ
NE
E
exp
(
−γE
γE
)
dγE
=
∫ ∞
(1+µ)
2Rs
−1
(
1− exp
(
−(2
Rs(1 + γE)− 1
γB
))NA γNE−1E
Γ(NE) γ
NE
E
exp
(
−γE
γE
)
dγE
Then, we apply binomial theorem on
(
1− exp
(
− (2
Rs (1+γE)−1
γB
))NA
and simplify it
such that
I =
NA∑
K=0
(
NA
K
)
(−1)K exp
(
−K(2
Rs − 1)
γB
)∫ ∞
(1+µ)
2Rs
−1
exp
(
−K(2
RsγE)
γB
)
γNE−1E
Γ(NE) γ
NE
E
exp
(
−γE
γE
)
dγE
(33)
we obtain secrecy outage probability for MISOME scenario where Alice employs TAS
while Eve performs MRC in (34) after substituting (24),(33) into (27), thus the closed-
form expression for MISOME scenario is
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pso=
NA∑
k=0
(
NA
k
)
(−1)k
ps(µ)
exp
(
−k2
Rs−1
γB
)(
γB
γB+k2
RsγE
)NE
Q
(
NE,−
(
γB + k2
RsγE
) (
2Rs − 1− µ
)
2RsγBγE
)
− 1
ps(µ)
(
1−exp
(
− µ
γB
))NA
Q
(
NE,−
2Rs − 1− µ
2RsγE
)
. (34)
3.2.3. MISOSE Scenario
The closed-form expression for secrecy outage probability of the MISOSE wiretap
channel, where only Alice has multiple antennas and then employs TAS, is given as
pso=exp
(
2Rs−1−µ
2RsγE
)[
2F1
(
−NA,
γB
2RsγE
, 1+
γB
2RsγE
, e
− µ
γB
)
−
(
1−exp
(
− µ
γB
))NA] 1
ps(µ)
. (35)
3.2.4. MIMOSE Scenario
Secrecy outage probability of the MIMOSE wiretap channel where Alice and Bob,
both have multiple antennas but Eve is a single antenna device. Alice employs TAS
and Bob resorts MRC.
pso =
NA∑
K=0
(
NA
K
)
(−1)K
1− ps(µ)
exp
(
−K(2
Rs − 1)
γB
) ∑
s0+s1+..sNB−1=K
(
K
s0, s1, .., sNB−1
)
NB−1∏
t=0
(
1
t!
)st st∗t∑
p=0
(
st ∗ t
p
)(
2Rs − 1
γB
)st∗t−p(2Rs
γB
)p(
K2RsγE + γB
γBγE
)−p−1
Γ
[
(p+ 1) ,
(
K2RsγE + γB
γBγE
)(
µ+ 1− 2Rs
−2RsγE
)]
− 1
ps(µ)
Q
(
NE,−
2Rs − 1− µ
2RsγE
)
P
(
NB,
µ
γB
)NA
(36)
36
4. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
In the previous chapter, we derived the closed-form expressions of secrecy outage
probabilities for MIMOME, MIMOSE, MISOME and MISOSO scenarios. In this
chapter, we discuss the numerical analysis of these expressions as a function of average
SNR at Bob γB, average SNR at Eve γE and rate of confidential information RS . We
analyze the impact of these parameters on secrecy outage probability with the different
combination of the antennas at Alice, Bob and Eve. We also analyze the reliability of
communication.
4.1. Comparison Between Conventional and Revisited Formulation
We compare the conventional and revisited secrecy outage formulation for MISOME
scenario. The old secrecy outage formulation for MISOME is given in [44] and an
Figure 4.1: Secrecy outage probability versus Rs for MISOME scenario
alternative secrecy outage formula is presented in (36), which is used to calculate the
probability of a message transmission not achieving perfect secrecy. This formulation
will be used to fulfill the required security requirements. Figure 4.1 shows the secrecy
outage probability as a function of the rate of confidential information. We present
the comparison between old secrecy outage formulation given in [44] and new secrecy
outage formulation given in (36) for MISOME scenario for two antennas at Alice, sin-
gle at Bob and two at Eve. Alice can be treated as a base station in a network while
Bob as a mobile user. Where Alice employs, transmit antenna selection scheme and
Eve resorts to the maximum ratio combining. The new formulation has the rate of
transmitted codewords adaptively chosen as Rb = Cb. For different values of rate of
confidential information, the maximum outage probability for the new formulation is
achieved by setting the on-off SNR threshold to the minimum value of µ = 2Rs−1.
The average SNR at Eve, γE is 0 dB. It is clear from the figure for two different val-
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ues of average SNR at Bob γB that both formulations have noticeably different outage
probabilities. We observe from the Figure 4.1 that secrecy outage is reduced in the
new formulation. Therefore, the security levels cannot be measured directly through
the old formulation anymore. Simulation results show security can be improved with
an increase in the number of Alice’s antenna, even if Eve has multiple antennas. Our
proposed TAS scheme requires only one RF chain, resulting in a reduced cost, power
consumption, operation complexity and size at the cost of a small loss in performance
when compared with multiple RF chains.
4.2. Impact of the Number of Antennas on Secrecy Performance
In this section, we analyze the impact of number of antennas on secrecy performance
for MISOSE and MIMOME scenario as a function of legitimate link SNR and confi-
dential rate.
4.2.1. MISOSE Scenario
Figure 4.2 shows the secrecy outage probability of SISOSE and MISOSE scenarios as
a function of confidential rate. In SISOSE case, Alice, Bob and Eve are single nodes.
Let’s assume that Alice can access the CSI on both main and Eve’s channel. This is
primarily the case in Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) setting where Eve is not
necessarily an eavesdropper but another user or node. Alice can estimate the CSI on
both the channels by sending communication signals. Alice can leverage the available
CSI on both channels for achieving the required secrecy through the transmission of
useful symbols to Bob when the instantaneous SNR values are such that the instanta-
Figure 4.2: Secrecy outage probability versus Confidential rate
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42
4.4. Secrey-Reliability Assessement under Ultra-Reliable Requirement
We discuss the secrecy-reliability assessement under ultra-reliable requirement. Figure
Figure 4.9: Secrecy outage probability as a function of Target Reliability σ
4.9 illustrates the outage secrecy probability as a function of target reliability for NA
= 4, NE = 2 and NB = 4 at γB = 5 dB and γE = 0 dB, For worse case condition
where the reliability target is defined as solely based on the secrecy rate, therefore
Ptx(Rs, γB) ≥ σ, which after solving it in RS yields results, the results are put in (32).
We evaluate σ, which is considered as a QoS or reliability indicator. Our results show
that the system becomes secure as the value of target reliability σ increases, which is
a counter-intuitive result once the system is more reliable and secure at the same time.
However notice that secure rate RS is tied to the reliability so that Ptx = σ, which
allows for large secure rates that are not optimal and therefore large security outage
probability. The rate decreases with an increase in target reliability, but this is not an
optimum rate. In fact, this is the worse case scenario as discussed as well in [39]. Thus
we aim to perform rate allocation as our future work.
43
5. CONCLUSION
In this research work, we discuss physical layer security for machine type communi-
cation networks due to its high vulnerability to eavesdropping attack. Communication
security is one of the basics requirement for 5G and, unusually for IoT and MTC gave
their full range of military, industrial and commercial applications. Existing techniques
for security are mainly based on cryptography, which works at upper levels of wireless
network media with the assumption that eavesdropper has constrained computational
capabilities. However, this assumption no longer holds true due to the drastic growth
in the computation capabilities of devices. Authentication procedures, maintenance,
and distribution of encryption keys are some of the other issues with existing security
techniques, In case both parties (transmitter and receiver) do not have such a key or
code, another secure channel is needed to share this key or code that requires network
resources. Physical layer security as an alternative to cryptography can eradicate the
need for encryption keys and is considered more superior for achieving tight security
against any level of computational capabilities. Recent developments in the field of In-
formation Theory has resulted in an increased interest in physical level security since
it can improve the error probability and confidentiality.
In this work, we considered the multiple wiretap channels where the legitimate pair,
Alice (the transmitter) and Bob (the receiver), communicates in the presence of un-
trusted eavesdropper (Eve) who attempts to breach the transmission originating from
Alice. First, we provided a literature review in chapter 2 where we studied the two
secrecy outage probability formulations for SISOSE case where all three nodes have
a single antenna. The old formulation is given in [27] and in the same article, it was
revealed that even if eavesdropper has better average SNR than the legitimate pair,
we still have perfectly secure communication. In article [39] the new formulation for
secrecy outage probability is derived even if the transmitted message fails to achieve
perfect secrecy. In chapter 3 we provided a system model for multiple antennas sys-
tem to increase the security and reliability of the wireless communication system, this
arrangement provides diversity as well as high rate of data transfer because of multi-
plexing gain. Alice, Bob and Eve all could estimate their own channel state informa-
tion. Generalized closed-form expressions have been evaluated for the secrecy outage
probability of MIMOME while assuming that Alice employs TAS and receivers utilize
MRC, for MISOSO only Alice uses TAS, for MIMOSE Alice exploits TAS and Bob
resorts to MRC and for MISOME Alice utilizes TAS but only Eve implements MRC.
We then provided the numerical analysis of all closed-form expressions introduced.
We investigated the behavior of secrecy outage probability as a function of average
SNR at Bob γB, the rate of confidential information RS and reliability. We noticed
that security is enhanced by the increase in the number of the antennas at Alice and
it reduced with an increase in the number of the antennas at Eve. In future, we aim
to study rate allocation for the provided closed-form expressions of multiple antenna
systems. We will work on traffic models for MTC networks, and the basis for design-
ing and optimization of networks of the future are considered to be the understanding
of MTC traffic properties. While doing so, it is pertinent to keep into perspective the
relevant QoS schemes and the provision of suitable MTC services for communication
without conceding any of the regular HTC services (data, voice, and video).
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We also aim to work on covert communication which is a type of communication
in which the information transmitted is kept hidden from any potential eavesdropper,
i.e., warden. The signals received by the warden must be the same as the ambient
signals, i.e., signals received when no transmission is being made. The maximum
amount of information which can be covert communicated measures the same as a
square root of the total number of channel users. The impact of channel uncertainties
on covert communication shows the scenario in which the noise level is random and
stays constant during the communication. It is also unknown to the warden, which
makes it very difficult for a warden to determine whether the reception it is receiving
is signal or noise. Resultantly, favorable covert communication rates are attainable
in the absence of unknown noise level supposition. Thus, covert communication is a
promising line of research.
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